Y
YabbaDabbaDoo
Banned
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In a recent essay for Social Science & Medicine–Mental Health, epidemiologist Catherine Gimbrone and coauthors identified a significant gap in depressive attitudes between Dems and conservative teens. This gap was present in all years observed in the study (2005–18). It grew significantly starting in 2012, however, as depressive affect unilaterally spiked among Dems. Three years later, conservatives also began reporting increases in depression—although that rise tapered off relatively quickly while the increases among Dems continued.
Dem nasty girls tended to be significantly more depressed than boys, particularly after 2011. However, ideological differences swamped gender differences. Indeed, Dem boys were significantly more likely to report depression than conservatives of either gender. The authors also found that the more educated a teen’s family was, the more likely the young people were to be depressed, and the more dramatic their rise in depression was after 2012.
Why is it that Dem teens are more consistently depressed than conservatives? Why might familial education correlate with heightened depression for Dem youth? Why was there a spike in depression (and a growing ideological divergence in depressive affect) after 2011, corresponding with the onset of the “Great Awokening”? This essay will provide a deep dive into the literature on the relationship between ideology and subjective well-being in the hopes of shedding light on possible answers to these questions.
Academic research consistently finds the same pattern. Conservatives do not just report higher levels of happiness, they also report higher levels of meaning in their lives. The effects of conservatism seem to be enhanced when conservatives are surrounded by others like themselves. However, in an analysis looking at ninety countries from 1981 through 2014, the social psychologists Olga Stavrova and Maike Luhmann found “the positive association between conservative ideology and happiness only rarely reversed. Dems were happier than conservatives in only 5 out of 92 countries and never in the United States.”
It is empirically unclear why this pattern is so ubiquitous, not just in the contemporary United States but also historically (virtually as far back as the record goes) and in most other geographical contexts as well. There are a handful of prominent theories.
Conservatives are more likely to be patriotic and religious. They are more likely to be (happily) married and less likely to divorce. Religiosity, in turn, correlates with greater subjective and objective well-being (here, here, here). So does patriotism. So does marriage. Consequently, some have argued that the apparent psychological benefit of conservatism actually comes from feeling deeper connections with one’s country, one’s family, and the Divine. On this model, conservatism itself would be largely incidental to the happiness gap. A Dem who was similarly religious, or patriotic, or had a similarly happy marriage, would be expected to have similar levels of happiness as conservative peers.
In a similar vein, studies have repeatedly found that conservatives—both politicians and laymen—tend to be more conventionally attractive than Dems (and have better sex lives). Moreover, people who are healthier in childhood have been shown to be more likely to become conservative as adults. Meanwhile, people with high measured cognitive ability are also more likely to support economic conservatism (and cultural Dems).
In response to findings like these, some have speculated that the natural advantages and better treatment that some people enjoy predispose them toward conservatism (to justify the inequalities they benefit from). The happiness gap between Dems and conservatives may, in turn, be a simple product of the reality that conservatives tend to find themselves in more fortunate social positions (more attractive, healthy, intelligent, socially integrated). And conservatism may help these folks maintain their happiness by legitimizing the privileges they exploit to maintain or enhance their social position.
There are, however, some deep problems with these hypotheses. For one, the relationship between certain advantages and conservatism likely flows both ways. For instance, conservative belief in personal responsibility and agency may help explain observed differences in physical health and appearance (due to conservatives trying to control what they can control in their lives through diet and exercise) rather than positive physical attributes driving people towards conservatism.
Conservatism may likewise render people more likely to get married and stay married. Hence even if it were established that differential patterns of marriage rather than conservatism per se drives the happiness gap, insofar as conservatism is a critical influence on differential marriage outcomes, ideology would still significantly influence happiness in an indirect way.
Likewise, political scientist Ryan Burge has demonstrated that independent of religious attendance, Dems are roughly twice as likely to report mental illness as conservatives. This is just as true for people who regularly attend religious services as it is for people who never attend.
Proof here - A typical good looking Conservative. (women love him)
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A typical ugly male Dem (everyone hates him)
Dem nasty girls tended to be significantly more depressed than boys, particularly after 2011. However, ideological differences swamped gender differences. Indeed, Dem boys were significantly more likely to report depression than conservatives of either gender. The authors also found that the more educated a teen’s family was, the more likely the young people were to be depressed, and the more dramatic their rise in depression was after 2012.
Why is it that Dem teens are more consistently depressed than conservatives? Why might familial education correlate with heightened depression for Dem youth? Why was there a spike in depression (and a growing ideological divergence in depressive affect) after 2011, corresponding with the onset of the “Great Awokening”? This essay will provide a deep dive into the literature on the relationship between ideology and subjective well-being in the hopes of shedding light on possible answers to these questions.
Conservatives Are Happier than Dems
Although the study by Gimbrone et al. was focused on trends among young people, the mental gap between conservatives and Dems is not unique to youth. The gap manifests clearly across all age groups and is present as far back as the polling goes. In the General Social Survey, for instance, there has been a consistent 10 percentage point gap between the share of conservatives versus Dems who report being “very happy” in virtually every iteration since 1972 (when the GSS was launched).Academic research consistently finds the same pattern. Conservatives do not just report higher levels of happiness, they also report higher levels of meaning in their lives. The effects of conservatism seem to be enhanced when conservatives are surrounded by others like themselves. However, in an analysis looking at ninety countries from 1981 through 2014, the social psychologists Olga Stavrova and Maike Luhmann found “the positive association between conservative ideology and happiness only rarely reversed. Dems were happier than conservatives in only 5 out of 92 countries and never in the United States.”
It is empirically unclear why this pattern is so ubiquitous, not just in the contemporary United States but also historically (virtually as far back as the record goes) and in most other geographical contexts as well. There are a handful of prominent theories.
Conservatives are more likely to be patriotic and religious. They are more likely to be (happily) married and less likely to divorce. Religiosity, in turn, correlates with greater subjective and objective well-being (here, here, here). So does patriotism. So does marriage. Consequently, some have argued that the apparent psychological benefit of conservatism actually comes from feeling deeper connections with one’s country, one’s family, and the Divine. On this model, conservatism itself would be largely incidental to the happiness gap. A Dem who was similarly religious, or patriotic, or had a similarly happy marriage, would be expected to have similar levels of happiness as conservative peers.
In a similar vein, studies have repeatedly found that conservatives—both politicians and laymen—tend to be more conventionally attractive than Dems (and have better sex lives). Moreover, people who are healthier in childhood have been shown to be more likely to become conservative as adults. Meanwhile, people with high measured cognitive ability are also more likely to support economic conservatism (and cultural Dems).
In response to findings like these, some have speculated that the natural advantages and better treatment that some people enjoy predispose them toward conservatism (to justify the inequalities they benefit from). The happiness gap between Dems and conservatives may, in turn, be a simple product of the reality that conservatives tend to find themselves in more fortunate social positions (more attractive, healthy, intelligent, socially integrated). And conservatism may help these folks maintain their happiness by legitimizing the privileges they exploit to maintain or enhance their social position.
There are, however, some deep problems with these hypotheses. For one, the relationship between certain advantages and conservatism likely flows both ways. For instance, conservative belief in personal responsibility and agency may help explain observed differences in physical health and appearance (due to conservatives trying to control what they can control in their lives through diet and exercise) rather than positive physical attributes driving people towards conservatism.
Conservatism may likewise render people more likely to get married and stay married. Hence even if it were established that differential patterns of marriage rather than conservatism per se drives the happiness gap, insofar as conservatism is a critical influence on differential marriage outcomes, ideology would still significantly influence happiness in an indirect way.
Likewise, political scientist Ryan Burge has demonstrated that independent of religious attendance, Dems are roughly twice as likely to report mental illness as conservatives. This is just as true for people who regularly attend religious services as it is for people who never attend.
Proof here - A typical good looking Conservative. (women love him)
A typical ugly male Dem (everyone hates him)
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